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Two decades ago the process of agencification of the EU administration was initiated and 
has gained momentum ever since. Today there are about 30 agencies scattered across the 
EU, active in different policy fields and entrusted with different tasks. In a first part this 
article looks at the history and rationale of agency creation and at the political framework in 
which EU agencies operate. In a second part, building on the definition and classification of 
agencies by Griller and Orator, a closer look will be taken at the institutional position of the 
EU agencies. Because the creation of agencies was neither excluded nor foreseen in the 
Founding Treaties most authors search for clarification in the 1958 Meroni ruling of the 
CJEU. This article challenges this line of reasoning by identifying a number of problems. 
Furthermore this article also challenges the way in which a number of authors deduct the 
principle of institutional balance from the Meroni ruling, applying it to the functioning of 
agencies, thereby misconstruing the Court's original concern which it sought to express 
through this principle. In a last part the article links this legal discussion to the political 
discussions on the future framework for the agencies, identifying a critical role for the 
Commission in supporting the above mentioned dominant legal reasoning. 
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§1. INTRODUCTION 
 
EU Agencies are a relatively new yet distinctive feature of the Union’s administrative system. 
Paradoxically, this distinctiveness does not result so much from their visibility, as from the 
sheer number of agencies that has been established and the obscurity in which most of them 
are shrouded. 1 In the contemporary academic debate, a lot of authors refer to the Meroni 
judgment when discussing the delegation of powers to these agencies. This article challenges 
the way in which the Meroni judgment is being interpreted in the current debate on agencies, 
by trying to re-construct the original meaning of the judgment. Before tackling this issue 
however, the history, rationale and politics behind the establishment of agencies is explored in 
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 Today there are around 30 EU agencies established and more are in the pipeline. 
a brief general overview. The focus then turns to the legal framework itself. As is explained, 
agencies are not foreseen in primary law nor is there any case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) specifically dealing with the institutional position of the 
agencies.  
 
As noted, it is this hiatus that numerous authors but also the European Commission have tried 
to remedy by referring to the Meroni judgment. In its ruling, dating from 1958, the CJEU 
ruled out the possibility for the High Authority to delegate discretionary powers to bodies 
established under private law.2 The main thrust of this article is the twofold assertion that the 
facts and context of the Meroni case stand in the way of a simple transposition of the ruling to 
the functioning of the current day agencies and that a mis-reading of the Court’s judgment is 
at the root of much of the contemporary literature on agencies. Lastly, the challenges of 
agencification were also noticed by the Union institutions, which are currently discussing a 
framework for the agencies, after the Commission’s withdrawal of its initial proposal for a 
draft interinstitutional agreement for such a framework. Therefore, in a third and final part, 
the proposal, which brought together the politics of agencification identified in the general 
overview and the criticized contemporary reading of the Meroni judgment in the second part, 
is scrutinized, as well as the possible consequences of a re-read Meroni judgment for the 
debate between the institutions. 
 
§2. AGENCIES: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
A. DEFINING AGENCIES 
 
To this day there is no official definition of ‘agency’ as established by EU legislation. In its 
2002 Communication on the operating framework for regulatory agencies, the Commission 
notes that the various agencies have certain formal characteristics in common: they were all 
created by regulation, have legal personality and have a certain degree of organisational and 
financial autonomy.3 In its draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for 
                                                 
2
 Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v. High Authority [1958] ECR 133. 
3
 Communication from the Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM 
(2002) 718 final, p. 3. 
the European regulatory agencies, the Commission failed further to develop this embryonic 
definition and defined the regulatory agency as, ‘any autonomous legal entity set up by the 
legislative authority in order to help regulate a particular sector at European level and help 
implement a Community policy.’4 This said, the Commission does not explain why the so-
called executive agencies should be excluded from this definition and this strengthens the 
impression that its generic definition lacks clarity and precision. The definition that is used 
here is that proposed by Griller and Orator who define agencies as relatively independent, 
permanent bodies with legal personality, emanating from secondary Union law and charged 
with specific tasks.5  
 
B. GROWTH AND RATIONALE OF AGENCIES 
 
The number of EU agencies has grown steadily over the years in a number of consecutive 
waves. The first wave occurred in the 1970s and resulted in the establishment of two agencies. 
The agencies of the first wave have only limited powers. More important are the second and 
third waves, of the 1990s and 2000s respectively: the second wave produced 11 new agencies; 
the third wave added another 16 and, as mentioned, is not yet complete.6 Although the use of 
agencies dates back to the 1970s, only in the 1990s did the Community, and later the Union, 
start to rely more heavily on them to carry out certain specific administrative tasks. What is 
more, it was only with the second wave, which substantially increased the number of 
agencies, that the academic debate on these new institutions was sparked. 
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Since the 1990s the body of academic literature on European agencies has grown steadily and 
the many different aspects of this institutional phenomenon explored. For one, the rationale 
behind this institutional development is debated quite extensively. The popularity of the 
agency-instrument has been explained by referring to the numerous benefits or possibilities it 
unlocks for policymakers. Some of these are general in nature, they apply to any level of 
government, be it regional, national or supranational and some of these are especially relevant 
for the European level. When these benefits are discussed, a distinction can also be made 
between the ‘technocratic’ and ‘political’ reasons for agency creation. The latter are potent 
elucidators for the political game behind the creation of these agencies. Often cited 
‘technocratic’ reasons are: facilitating the use of independent scientific experts, enhancing the 
credibility of long term policy commitments, isolating decision-making from politics.7 In 
essence the technocratic rationale of agencies lies in the independence of their technical 
and/or scientific (risk) assessments. This has been recognized by the Commission as well who 
describes that independence as the real raison d’être of agencies.8 Specific to or highly 
relevant for the agencies of the EU is that they may foster administrative integration,9 which 
would lead to a uniform application of common rules.10 They enable a discrete, almost 
invisible, deepening of political integration,11 yet also provide a certain policy area with more 
transparency and relieve overburdened institutions, which can then focus on their core 
responsibilities.12  
 
                                                 
7
 Thatcher, ‘The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe’, 18 
Governance 3 (2005), p. 349. 
8
 Communication from the Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM 
(2002) 718 final, p. 5. 
9
 Kreher, ‘Agencies in the European Community – a step towards administrative integration in Europe’, 4 
Journal of European Public Policy 2 (1997), p. 238-241. 
10
 Dehousse, ‘Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European agencies’, 4 Journal of 
European Public Policy 2 (1997), p. 246-261. 
11
 Shapiro, ‘The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European Union’, 4 Journal of 
European Public Policy 2 (1997), p. 281-282. 
12
 J. Trondal, An Emergent European Executive Order (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 148. 
Vos also mentions potential pitfalls associated with the use of agencies.13 These are political 
and legal in nature. They may be summarized as the requirements of good governance and 
related to this are the legal challenges that the agency model entails. The powers vested in 
agencies are powers transferred to them from other institutions or governmental levels. In an 
EU context this means that, according to Vos, one should be wary about the effects of this 
delegation of power on the institutional balance. Furthermore, a legal base for this delegation 
is needed and the constitutional guarantees to which the exercise of the transferred powers 
was subject, prior to delegation, must be upheld. 
 
C. A CLASSIFICATION 
 
Every author contributing to the topic also has his or her own classification scheme of 
agencies. Although some of the schemes follow the same logic, the end results are never the 
same: different terminology is used and different aspects highlighted. This should not come as 
too big a surprise, for even the Commission has difficulties in classifying the agencies: a 
confusing and contradictory terminology is apparent in its communications. First, the 
Commission makes a distinction between the executive and regulatory agencies,14 then it 
differentiates in that second category between decision-making agencies and executive 
agencies.15 The heterogeneity in classifications reflects the diversity and heterogeneity of the 
agencies themselves, some of which may have similar powers and tasks but none of which are 
organized or function in the same way. In this contribution, the instrumental classification by 
Griller and Orator is borrowed.16 Instead of following a structural, temporal or functional 
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approach, they look at the intensity of prerogatives entrusted to the agencies. This approach 
results in four types of regulatory agencies: ‘ordinary’ agencies without decision-making 
powers, if decisions need to be taken this is done by the Commission;17 ‘pre-decision-making’ 
agencies, enjoying a considerable influence over the adoption of the final decision, which is 
again taken by the Commission.18 Concerning these agencies it is important to note that while 
the formal decision is taken by the Commission, the actual decision generally lies in the hands 
of the agencies.  
 
The third type of agency is the genuine decision-making agency, having the capacity to enact 
legal instruments binding upon third parties.19 The major difference compared to the 
preceding category is that the de iure situation is being aligned to the de facto reality. 
Agencies of the third type do not require the rubberstamp of the Commission, unlike the 
agencies of the second type, but it is important to realize that even the latter hold considerable 
power, since the Commission generally lacks the expertise to assess their advice properly.20  
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The last type is the true ‘regulatory’ or rule-making agency holding discretionary power to 
translate broad legislative guidelines into concrete instruments.  
 
Most of the EU regulatory agencies belong to the first and second category. The most 
interesting EU agencies fall into the third category, whereas the Union legislator has not (yet) 
founded agencies that can truly be categorized as regulatory agencies. 
 
D. THE POLITICS OF ESTABLISHING AGENCIES 
 
Chiti notes that despite the many differences between the various establishing regulations, the 
agencification process has consolidated a more or less uniform organizational framework. He 
sees this uniformity in the way all European agencies have a double purpose: not only do they 
institutionalize co-operation and integration among the Member States’ administrations and 
between the latter and the Commission; they also give a number of EU policy fields a certain 
decentralized order, in the centre of which we find a body that is external to the Commission, 
but nonetheless partly subject to its influence.21 The notion of agencies as a form of 
decentralized governance is frequently made, also by the Commission,22 but as Scott points 
out,23 there is hardly anything decentralized about the agencies apart from the fact that they 
are not geographically located in Brussels. This is quite clear when tracing the origin of the 
powers entrusted to the agencies. Most of these powers are not delegated by the Commission 
or any other EU institution but were previously exercised at the national level. Therefore, 
agencification actually comes down to centralization.  
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 Chiti correctly, however, notes that agencies perform a double purpose and constitute a 
compromise between the Commission and the Member States. The role of the Commission is 
especially important, since it was and will remain responsible for making any proposals to 
establish new agencies. Keleman’s narration on the establishment of the European Food 
Safety Agency (EFSA) is quite revealing in this regard.24 The Commission’s basic principle is 
the continuous aggrandizement of powers at the European level, in other words, a 
Europeanization of powers. This is preferably accomplished ‘in house’, through the 
aggrandizement of the Commission’s powers. In general the Member States are reluctant to 
give new and more powers to the Commission. Therefore, if further integration cannot be 
achieved in the Commission’s preferred way, it opts for a further Europeanization of powers 
through the establishment of agencies. Here is where the game of forces, alluded to by Chiti, 
unfolds further.25 The Member States are much more enthusiastic about giving powers to an 
agency than to the Commission: not only do they have representatives in the Boards of the 
agencies, the Boards also play a vital role in the appointment of the presidents of the agencies. 
Agencies are also geographically dispersed, meaning the seat of an agency is an attractive 
trophy to national leaders and therefore often the subject of lengthy negotiation.26  
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 Through the establishment of agencies, the Commission achieves further integration, albeit 
through a second-best approach. It is an approach that also entails certain risks, as former 
President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, made clear during a speech at the time of the 
IGC in 2000, where some Member States wanted to amend the Treaties to facilitate the 
establishment of agencies. Prodi warned that such fragmentation undermines the Community 
method by creating conflicting centres of powers.27 Therefore just as the Member States are 
wary of too powerful a Commission, so the Commission itself is wary of too powerful 
agencies. This is why the Commission is very keen to refer in its policy documents on the 
functioning of the agencies to the Meroni ruling. Applying a strict reading of the Meroni 
ruling to the agencies is part of the Commission's policy of keeping a check on the powers of 
the agencies. This reasoning has proven quite successful and a number of authors have 
adopted it without much question. In general, however, the Commission is in something of a 
quandary in its balancing act between keeping a check on agencies – in other words, 
controlling them -- but in the meantime reassuring the Member States that it does not 
dominate the agencies. This again is an important reason as to why the Commission 
wrongfully speaks about decentralisation through agencification (see supra). As already 
pointed out, sometimes further integration is only possible through agencies because agencies 
are perceived as distinct from the Commission. This is why the Commission describes 
agencies as satellites:28 they are separate, yet not wholly independent entities from the main 
body since to make them completely independent would open the door to bureaucratic 
competition. This is the Commission’s delicate equilibrium exercise. 
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These general political considerations are also translated in the internal organization and 
functioning of agencies. An in-depth exposé of the different arrangements for each agency 
falls outside the purpose of this article, but it is important to keep in mind that each time a 
new agency is being established, this is preceded by a political battle between the Member 
States in the Council, the Commission and, in recent years, the European Parliament. The ad 
hoc way of creating agencies and the political struggle during the decision-making process 
have resulted in the plethora of agencies, the internal organization of which, although built on 
a typical three part structure,29 is never the same for any two different agencies. More 
concretely, the representation in the boards and the selection and nomination of the director 
are major subjects of debate in the decision-making leading to the establishment of an agency, 
the outcome of which greatly determines the influence of the respective principals over the 
newly established agency.30  
 
Therefore, when Chiti speaks of ‘a rather uniform organizational framework’31 this must be 
understood as referring to the political reality in the relationship of the agencies with the 
Treaty Institutions and the national administrations, a reality that seems to confirm the neo-
functionalist theory of power games between the Commission and the Member States. 
Nevertheless, a uniform legal framework is missing; hence the Commission’s proposals to 
establish one (see infra). These proposals also entailed a uniformization of the internal 
organization of the agencies. 
 
§3. THE MERONI RULING 
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 One of the main subjects of debate on agencies is the possibility of delegating powers to them. 
Is there any possibility to create these institutions and transfer powers to them? Most authors 
look to the ancient Meroni ruling of the Court of Justice to find an answer to this question.  
 
In the Meroni case, the applicant company challenged the way the High Authority had 
organized the financial arrangements of the ferrous scrap regime. Meroni not only argued that 
the decision requiring it to pay a sum of money to the Imported Ferrous Scrap Equalization 
Fund was unlawful because of the infringement of an essential procedural requirement and the 
failure to state reasons but, more fundamentally, it also questioned the underlying general 
decision in which the High Authority delegated the powers for the financial operation of the 
regime to two bodies under Belgian private law, the so-called Brussels Agencies.32 Meroni 
essentially argued that, according to Article 8 of the ECSC Treaty, the High Authority was 
held ‘to ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained in accordance with the 
provisions thereof’ and that this did not leave any possibility for the High Authority to 
delegate its powers. 
 
However, in its judgment, the Court did not exclude the possibility of entrusting certain tasks 
to bodies established under private law. After the Court had laid down the general possibility 
to delegate it proceeded to narrow that possibility down substantially. It referred to the general 
objectives of the Treaty as listed in Article 3 ECSC and noted that it is not certain that they 
could all be simultaneously pursued in all circumstances and that reconciling these objectives 
in individual cases requires genuine discretionary power. The Court proceeded by drawing 
attention to the provision in Article 3 ECSC that precedes the different objectives and in 
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which it is stated that the institutions of the Community shall aim to achieve the objectives 
‘within the framework of their respective powers and responsibilities and in the common 
interest’. This balance of powers was, according to the Court, characteristic of the institutional 
structure of the Community and was no less than a ‘fundamental guarantee granted by the 
Treaty, in particular to the undertakings and associations of undertakings to which it applies’. 
This guarantee would become ineffective if discretionary powers were to be entrusted to 
bodies other than those established by the Treaty. The Court thus concluded that the High 
Authority could not confer upon the authority to which powers are delegated, powers different 
from those it has itself received under the Treaty. The exercise of the powers entrusted to the 
body to which the powers are delegated must be subject to the same conditions as those to 
which it would have been subject if the High Authority had exercised them directly, 
particularly as regards the requirements to state reasons and to publish; and even when 
entitled to delegate its powers, the High Authority has to take an express decision transferring 
them and the delegation may relate only to clearly defined executive, but not discretionary 
powers. 
 
§4. APPLYING MERONI TO THE EU AGENCIES 
 
This ruling by the Court remained largely obscure for the decades to come but, as the 
academic interest in agencies was sparked by the second wave of agency-creation in the 
1990s, so the interest in this ruling grew. Lenaerts was one of the first to frame the 
agencification process at EU level by referring to the Meroni ruling.33 He referred to the 
ruling when discussing the possibility of delegating powers to an internal body and explicitly 
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discussed the transposability of this judgment, based on the ECSC Treaty, to the EEC Treaty. 
These are two important elements that were also taken up by other authors in later 
contributions. While the latter was subject to serious academic debate, it is argued that the 
academic debate should focus more on the first of those presumptions, even more so given 
that the question on the transposability to the EC Treaty seems to have been solved by the 
Court in its case law. Some authors argued that in the context of the ECSC Treaty, a traité loi, 
the High Authority was endowed with important and detailed regulatory and implementing 
powers. The EEC Treaty, however, was a traité cadre with broad objectives to be achieved 
progressively and where the implementation powers mainly lay with the national 
administrations. Endowing European Agencies with powers would then not amount to a 
delegation of powers from a Union institution to that agency but would in fact come down to 
an extraction of powers from the national level, hence the Meroni ruling would have no 
bearing.34  
 
A. FROM ECSC TO EU 
 
Craig, Griller and Orator note that in a couple of recent judgments the Court of Justice has 
referred to the Meroni ruling. This would indeed confirm the transposability already identified 
by Lenaerts in 1993. In 2005, two of these rulings were made by the CJEU. In Tralli the Court 
applied the Meroni doctrine to an internal delegation within the ECB, whereby the Governing 
Council of the ECB delegated the power to adopt and amend the rules implementing the 
Conditions of Employment to the Executive Board.35 In Alliance for Natural Health the Court 
applied the Meroni condition of strictly executive powers to the delegation of implementing 
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powers from the Community legislator to the Commission.36 Not only did the Court transpose 
the Meroni doctrine to the EC Treaty it also broadened the scope of the doctrine. The latter is 
generally overlooked by legal authors but it is important to consider that the bodies to which 
powers were delegated in the Meroni case were bodies established under private law and 
which fell completely outside the Community structure. In Tralli and Alliance for Natural 
Health the Court applied (parts of) the Meroni doctrine on the delegation of powers from one 
Treaty institution to another and to delegation wholly within a Treaty institution. These 
situations are of course totally different from a legal point of view compared to the facts of the 
case in Meroni. 
 
B. MERONI AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE 
 
The Court itself however has not (yet) explicitly applied the Meroni doctrine to the 
functioning of the Union agencies. This has been done in academic writing following the 
example of Lenaerts. Yet the state of play of EU agencies has changed quite dramatically 
since 1993. The majority of the agencies postdate 1993 and some of these recent agencies 
have been endowed with far more extensive powers than were held by the agencies in 1993. 
Nevertheless, a lot of legal authors apply the Meroni doctrine to the current agencies and try 
to reconcile the current state of play with the doctrine. The main obstacle identified in legal 
literature to the further development of EU agencies is the principle of institutional balance 
derived from the Meroni ruling.37 Vos even states that the objection to agencies read into the 
Meroni case can be reduced to a single objection: distortion of the institutional balance. As 
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the Treaty legislator has distributed powers among different institutions, these institutions 
need to exercise their powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. A 
delegation of discretionary powers to EU agencies would then upset this balance.38  
 
As stated, paying the necessary respect to the principle of institutional balance puts a serious 
restraint on further agencification. This is why different authors have also looked into 
different ways of reconciling current but also future agencification with the principle. This is 
not an easy task, as some of their more recent EU agencies hold considerable powers. So 
much so that it has led several authors to conclude that only lip service is being paid to the 
Meroni doctrine and that in reality some EU agencies already operate in clear contravention 
of that doctrine.39 Vos argues that the institutional balance will not be upset so long as shifts 
of power are accompanied by reinforcing or re-balancing the existing institutions. She does 
not, however, elaborate on how to achieve this. Instead, she focuses more extensively on the 
need for a more modern view on administrative law. It is indeed the second of these 
observations that carries the most weight: there is an urgent and practical need for a modern 
administrative practice.  
 
Although ‘balance’ is a dynamic concept, it is hard to come up with ways to ‘rebalance’ the 
institutional balance after a shift in power, especially because the concept itself incarnates a 
zero sum conception of power. Griller and Orator on the other hand, do suggest ways of 
adjusting the institutional balance after such a shift in power.40 Their proposal is based largely 
on the strengthening of control mechanisms. These should secure the prerogatives of the 
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legislature to take the political decisions and secure the position of the Commission as the 
main EU institution responsible for the implementation of EU law. Such control mechanisms 
would, according to Griller and Orator, enable the agencies to wield discretionary powers 
while keeping in step with the Meroni doctrine. Through these proposals, Griller and Orator 
try to address the issue of institutional balance, which they derive from the Meroni ruling. 
Apart from the question of whether it is correct to do so, a question which will be addressed 
later, it is important to note that by concentrating on ways to resolve the issue of institutional 
balance, they have lost sight of an important affirmation of the Court in Meroni, namely that 
‘[a] delegation of powers … which implies a wide margin of discretion … cannot be 
considered as compatible with the requirements of the Treaty.’41 The Meroni doctrine thus 
simply precludes the possibility to delegate discretionary powers, which makes it hard to see 
how Griller and Orator, in their endeavour to apply the Meroni ruling to agencies and 
according at the same time discretionary powers to these agencies, can ever be successful.  
 
Apart from this legal issue, there are some practical issues undermining their proposals. If 
more control mechanisms are to be created and more control given to the other institutions, 
these institutions would also need the necessary expertise to exercise de facto control. If not, 
the newly created control mechanisms would merely result in an empty de iure control. 
However, if the in-house expertise of the Commission matches that of the agency, a necessary 
condition for effective control, this would call into question the raison d’être of agencies, in 
other words, the initial absence of expertise within the Commission or at European level. 
More control would also pose a threat to another important argument often cited in the 
defence of agencies: their independence from politics. Giving a veto right to the Commission 
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over agency decisions, as Griller and Orator propose, could have very drastic and possibly 
dangerous effects on the independence of these agencies. 
 
Finally, Van Ooik sees three main options for keeping the agencification process going 
without violating the principle of institutional balance:42 agencies could be endowed with a 
strict mandate, excluding the delegation of discretionary powers, which is, according to van 
Ooik, the case for agencies such as the Office for Harmonisation of the Internal Market 
(OHIM). Secondly, the agencies’ tasks could be confined to information gathering and 
processing, that is to say, only establishing ‘ordinary’ agencies of the first category. Thirdly, 
the institutional balance itself could be redefined by a Treaty amendment. Unlike Vos, Van 
Ooik sees no possibility to delegate true discretionary powers to the agencies without a Treaty 
change enabling this. Also according to Van Ooik, an effective system of supervision and 
control could mitigate objections against a far-reaching delegation of powers, an option which 
has been explored by Griller and Orator (compare supra).  
 
C. CURRENT AGENCY PRACTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE 
 
Before discussing the issue of the institutional balance, it is important to take a closer look at 
the criticism that the Meroni doctrine is already violated in the current agency practice. 
Indeed, assuming that the Meroni doctrine is applicable to the agencies, this would seem to be 
the case. The dominant line of reasoning in legal doctrine and the discourse of the 
Commission in its communications on agencies prescribe that for certain clearly specified 
                                                 
42
 Van Ooik, ‘The Growing Importance of Agencies in the EU’, in D., M., Curtin & R., A., Wessel (eds.) Good 
Governance and the European Union: reflection on concepts, institutions and substance, (Intersentia , Antwerp 
2005), p. 150-152. 
tasks, agencies may be allowed to participate in exercising executive function.43 This logic is 
apparent in Van Ooik’s reasoning on the compatibility of the powers of the OHIM with the 
Meroni doctrine. However, Van Ooik’s argument is not convincing. The Court in Meroni 
prohibited the delegation of discretionary powers and, although the OHIM has a strict 
mandate, this is not the same as saying it only exercises executive powers. The OHIM’s strict 
mandate is obvious: it is the Union’s trademark registration office and as such deals with 
applications from companies; it examines these applications on the basis of criteria laid down 
in the founding regulation and subsequently makes a decision which is binding on the 
applicant. A strict mandate does not however exclude the possibility of wielding extensive 
powers within the limits of this mandate. This becomes even more obvious when one takes a 
look at the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), one of the more recent agencies. Not 
only does it hold comparable powers to the OHIM and the Community Plant Variety Office 
(CPVO) since it takes an individual binding decision on whether or not to grant a certificate to 
an undertaking for a specific aviation product, it also holds more far reaching powers than the 
OHIM and CPVO. According to Article 18 of its founding regulation,44 the EASA also 
publishes certification specifications and guidance material for the industry. Riedel points out 
that these specifications, although de iure non-binding, are de facto binding on the 
undertakings, because only by following the guidelines of the EASA can they have reasonable 
certainty that their products will also be certified by the EASA.45 It might be said, therefore, 
that the EASA has a strict mandate since there are only so many well-defined tasks the EASA 
may undertake, but within these tasks the EASA has considerable powers, so much so that 
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one might qualify the EASA as a quasi regulatory agency.46 What is more, the de iure, non-
binding nature of the certification specifications means that few legal remedies are available 
to the undertaking wishing to challenge these guidelines of the EASA. As is argued later, it is 
this kind of problem that was central to the Meroni ruling and doctrine. 
 
Not only has agency practice already overstepped the limits set by the Meroni doctrine, the 
Court already seems to have endorsed this in its case law. In the Schräder case the applicant 
had applied to the CPVO for a Community plant variety right.47 The CPVO rejected this 
application because of a lack of distinctiveness of the candidate variety and this decision was 
later endorsed by the CPVO’s Board of Appeal. The applicant then brought an action before 
the General Court to have the rejection decision of the Board of Appeal annulled. In its ruling, 
before assessing the pleas of the applicant, the Court first determined the scope of its powers 
of judicial review. This is where there are a number of remarkable elements in the Court’s 
assessment. First, the Court seems oblivious to the fact that it is dealing with a decision of the 
CPVO, an agency. Instead the Court notes the wide margin of discretion a Community 
authority enjoys whenever it has to make a complex assessment in the performance of its 
duties. This again shows that endowing an agency with a strict mandate does not exclude the 
possibility of the agency wielding discretionary powers while fulfilling that mandate. One 
could of course argue that, although the Court seems to grant a wide margin of discretion to 
the CPVO in the exercise of its duties, this wide margin of discretion is not the same as the 
exercise of discretionary powers, which is needed to reconcile the different objectives of the 
Treaty, as envisaged in the Meroni ruling. After all, as Schneider notes, distinction can be 
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made between legislative discretion and administrative discretion to adopt context adequate 
decisions.48 However, the second remarkable element of the Court’s assessment is that it 
looks at the CPVO as the Community administration, justifying its limited judicial review by 
referring to previous case law on the genuine discretionary powers of the Commission in the 
Common Agricultural Policy and in its state aid control competence.49 In Schräder the Court 
even goes on to say ‘[h]owever, while the Community Courts recognise that the 
administration has a margin of appreciation in economic or technical matters that does not 
mean that they must decline to review the Commission’s [sic] interpretation of economic or 
technical data.’50 Thus, the Court recognized and endorsed the discretionary powers of the 
CPVO and did so by referring to the wide margin of discretion the Community administration 
may have. The Court did so without making any further distinction, within the administration 
itself, between the Commission and the agencies. In the case on appeal before the Court of 
Justice, this was examined further only by the Advocate General (AG), who endorsed the 
reasoning of the General Court.51  
 
D. BACK TO THE ROOTS: THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN MERONI 
 
It is clear that most authors see the principle of institutional balance as the main constraint on 
any evolution towards true regulatory agencies. Craig rightly observes that before tackling 
this legal problem, one should first reanalyze the rationale behind agency creation. As 
mentioned, numerous authors have pointed to the different merits of agencies to justify their 
existence and proliferation. But these are the merits of agencies vested with limited powers; 
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true regulatory agencies hold more extensive powers, which must of course be justified on 
other grounds. I argue that, even considering Craig’s observation, the principle of institutional 
balance that is central to the debate on delegation of powers to EU agencies and which many 
authors derive from the Meroni ruling cannot be derived automatically from that ruling. The 
main objection to this is that the principle of institutional balance was introduced, elaborated 
and refined by the Court in its case law. The principle as it is construed today is not the same 
as it was construed in the time of the Meroni ruling. However, most authors apply the modern 
interpretation of the principle in their analyses of the Meroni ruling and its consequences for 
contemporary agencies. Important to note is that at the time of the Meroni ruling, the Court 
did not even use the concept of institutional balance, as this was introduced only years later.52 
The Meroni judgment then only forms part of the different constituent elements of this 
principle as it evolved later in the case law of the Court.53 It is not self-evident, therefore, to 
apply the principle in its evolved interpretation to make sense of the Meroni judgment, as Vos 
would have us do when she explicitly refers to the institutional balance as applied by the 
Court in the Chernobyl case of 1990.54 Other authors do not explicitly refer to more recent 
case law on the institutional balance but do apply it implicitly.  
 
The main objection to applying the modern interpretation of the principle of institutional 
balance is that in its evolution from ‘balance of powers’ in Meroni to the modern day 
‘institutional balance’, a qualitative leap has occurred. As Jacqué points out, the principle of 
institutional balance and in Meroni the balance of powers was originally conceived as a 
substitute for the principle of the separation of powers of Montesquieu, the aim of which was 
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to protect individuals against the abuse of power.55 By upholding the balance of powers, the 
Court safeguarded not only the decision making process envisaged by the Treaties but 
ultimately also the accompanying guarantees for private individuals. Jacqué observes that this 
protective aspect of the principle seems gradually to have been lost as other means of 
protection appeared. This radically changes the way the Meroni ruling ought to be interpreted, 
and, as is explained later, even more so for agencies specifically. To understand the 
underlying logic of the Meroni ruling, it is interesting to read the Opinion of Advocate 
General Roemer in the case.56 The AG first remarks that in a modern constitutional state, two 
important conditions should apply to the delegation of powers to bodies under private law. In 
the first place, the delegation may only be done by law which accurately describes the content 
of the delegation and, in the next place, sufficient judicial protection against the acts of such 
organisations should be guaranteed. He then goes on to look at the specificity of the ECSC 
context and remarks that the Treaty does not explicitly provide for such delegation, neither 
does it prohibit it. What he foremost emphasizes is that, in the case of delegation, the regime 
of judicial protection as established by the Treaty should be upheld. This can be achieved, still 
according to AG Roemer, by equating the acts of these bodies with acts of the High Authority 
or by having the High Authority take the final decision. 
 
The AG took a relaxed stance towards delegation and was foremost pre-occupied with the 
continued respect for the system of judicial protection. The possible solutions offered by the 
AG are a further indication of this. The same pre-occupation was furthermore also central to 
the ruling by the CJEU. However, in its ruling the Court did not choose the solution offered 
by the AG, that is to say, the equation of acts of private bodies with acts of the High 
Authority. Instead the Court tried to solve the issue at hand by prescribing that these bodies 
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may only exercise strictly executive powers. Apparently in its juxtaposition of executive and 
discretionary powers, the Court assumed that only the exercise of the latter could give rise to 
problems pertaining to the regime of judicial protection as established by the Treaty. This is 
not the case, however, as the Court would also implicitly recognize a year later in the 
SNUPAT case.57 In SNUPAT the Court equated a notification by the same ‘Brussels Agencies’ 
as in Meroni to an undertaking ordering it to pay a certain amount of money to the Fund, with 
a decision of the High Authority. If the Court had ruled differently, such a notification would 
not have been open to applications for annulment, thus depriving the undertaking concerned 
of the protection offered by Treaty. 
 
Despite the different solutions worked out by the AG and the Court in Meroni, it must be 
clear that the key concern for both was the way in which rights of private parties, as 
guaranteed by the regime of judicial protection established by the Treaty, would still be 
guaranteed after certain tasks have been outsourced to private bodies outside the Treaty. This 
is of course something very different from the way the institutional balance is conceptualized 
today and should make clear that the relevance of Meroni for any delegation issue is its 
insistence on the obligation to respect the fundamental principle of the right to judicial 
protection. Ironically this is one of the problems in the current process of agencification, 
because of the ad hoc way in which the agencies have been established and the increasing 
powers conferred on them. Until the entry into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, no mention was 
made of the agencies in the Treaties and a piecemeal system of judicial supervision was put in 
place through the establishing regulations of the agencies.58 What is more, the Union 
legislator has not developed this system in a consistent way across the different regulations, 
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resulting in a different regime depending on the agency concerned. More specific problematic 
issues of agencification from the perspective of legal protection are inter alia the fact that 
some EU agencies have the power to give de iure non-binding advice, which is de facto 
binding and the jurisdiction of the CJEU over decisions of the agencies of the former second 
and third pillar.59 
 
E. AGENCIES: OUTSIDE BODIES? 
 
Although the concern expressed in Meroni applies generally, it is still important to point out 
that the Meroni ruling concerned the possibility to delegate certain powers to bodies 
established under private law. This is another potential pitfall when looking at the EU 
agencies through the Meroni ruling. It is quite clear that the agencies are not established under 
private law but are public institutions founded by secondary legislation. Although in issues of 
delegation -- regardless of the nature of the body to which powers are entrusted -- the greatest 
solicitude should be given to maintaining clear lines of accountability,  a different approach to 
the delegation issue is indeed justifiable depending on whether powers are entrusted to public 
or private bodies. Consequently, the references the Court made to the Meroni ruling in the 
above mentioned recent judgments dealing with inter-institutional and intra-institutional 
delegation should be seen as quite unfortunate. 
  
Instead a modern view of administration is necessary, allowing for flexible solutions such as 
establishing agencies and this is recognized by authors such as Vos.60 However, extending the 
scope of Meroni and applying it to agencies and private bodies alike is incompatible with such 
a modern view. Such an interpretation of Meroni does not allow for flexibility because it only 
distinguishes between Treaty institutions, on the one hand, and non-Treaty institutions on the 
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other, thus making it impossible to delegate significant tasks to agencies, despite the fact that 
they are fundamentally different from private bodies. The assertion that Meroni applies to 
Union Administration therefore does not sit well with a modern view on administration and, 
rather, amounts to conflation, since Meroni only dealt with delegation of powers to bodies 
established under private law. Hartley’s discussion on delegation exemplifies this. He 
distinguishes four types of delegation: delegation to the Commission, delegation to the 
Member States, delegation within an institution and delegation to outside bodies.61 It does not 
make much sense then to classify the EU agencies as outside bodies.  
 
These are a number of issues that have received little or no attention in legal doctrine. 
Although Griller and Orator claim Meroni remains good law,62 it cannot simply be assumed to 
frame the process of agencification. In Meroni the Court ruled on a delegation to bodies 
established under private law, but the fact that the EU agencies are public bodies warrants a 
more generous stance towards delegation of powers to EU agencies. Furthermore it was not 
the institutional balance of the Chernobyl case (compare supra) but the concern for the 
Treaty’s system of judicial protection that was central to the Court’s reasoning in Meroni and 
if the Meroni ruling is to be a guide in the process of agencification, this general concern 
should be honoured. Lastly, from a practical point of view, to apply a strict and untailored 
reading of Meroni to the EU agencies makes no sense either as a number of EU agencies 
already dispose of discretionary powers. This is completely ignored by the European 
Commission in its proposal for an EU agency framework, as is shown in the following and 
final section. 
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§5. THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERINSTITUTIONAL 
AGREEMENT AND FOLLOW UP 
 
After having highlighted these contentious issues, it is interesting to take a look at how the EU 
institutions themselves are trying to address the issue of agencification, but also how they 
interpret the Meroni judgment and what the implications would be for the current debate 
between the institutions in the light of Meroni re-read. 
 
As mentioned above, a legal framework for the EU agencies does not yet exist. This is still a 
subject of debate amongst the EU institutions and the Member States and already goes back 
quite some time. Vos notes that there was serious discussion during the IGC leading to the 
Nice Treaty on a possible amendment to the Treaties to provide for the possibility to establish 
agencies. Several proposals were made to this end. However, particularly because of 
reservations on the part of the Commission, none of these proposed amendments made it in 
the Nice Treaty and the matter remained unresolved. In 2001, in its White Paper on European 
Governance, the Commission announced that it would define the criteria for the creation of 
new agencies and the framework in which they operate by 2002.63 A year later the 
Commission announced that it would submit a proposal for an interinstitutional agreement to 
the Council and Parliament, setting out the conditions for the creation of regulatory 
agencies.64  
 
The Commission’s announced draft institutional agreement was only submitted to the Council 
and Parliament in 2005. The most perplexing thing was that the third wave of agency creation 
had already taken its full course: by then the Commission and the rest of the Union legislature 
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knowingly proposed and established new agencies in the absence of a clear framework.65 This 
does not quite seem in line with the notion of good governance, central to the Commission’s 
White Paper of 2001. 
 
A. THE PROPOSED INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT 
 
In its explanatory memorandum on its draft institutional agreement the Commission explains 
the need for a common framework: the lack of such a framework would result in an opaque 
situation, difficult for the public to understand and detrimental to legal certainty.66 The 
Commission then goes on to state the principles of good governance, according to which the 
proposed framework should be established.  A re-read Meroni judgment would indeed have 
the Commission focus on the principles of transparency and (judicial) accountability. The 
Commission, taking the principles of good governance as a starting point for its proposal, may 
also be interpreted in two ways: firstly, this is an obligation of result on the part of the 
Commission to ensure that its proposal fully achieves these principles; and it should be 
considered as the Commission’s major motive for initiating this proposal. The above 
observation on the continuing establishment of agencies in the absence of a framework, 
already casts doubt on these premises.  
 
Since the Commission’s proposal stranded, it is not analyzed in detail here. Instead some 
main elements are considered. To begin with, the nature of an interinstitutional agreement, 
which at most may only bind the institutions that are party thereto, may in no way amend the 
Treaties. Moreover the Commission only envisaged the framework to be applied to future 
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agencies, rather than all agencies. According to the Commission, applying the framework to 
future and existing agencies would be too difficult.67 As mentioned, this did not prevent the 
Commission and the Union legislature from establishing new agencies, to which the future 
framework would not apply, even after the Commission made its proposal for a framework. 
The scope of the draft agreement was also limited to the future first pillar agencies, excluding 
the second and third pillar agencies. This distinction does no longer make much sense 
following the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. As Curtin notes, a horizontal approach 
should be followed encompassing the entire EU administration and not just the former EC 
administration.68  
 
As for the proposal itself, an impact assessment would precede the establishment of agencies. 
It would include several factors and would inter alia apply the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. This is in response to a certain criticism of a number of agencies that are 
small or only have limited, supporting tasks:69 is their establishment justified in the light of 
these principles given the high fixed costs of establishing an agency? 
 
Furthermore, the Commission proposed to establish future agencies using the legal basis of 
the policy in which they would be active, rather than the then Article 308 EC (now Article 
352 TFEU). As the Commission acknowledged in its draft proposal, this new choice of legal 
basis was in fact already well established, since all the agencies of the third wave had been 
established in this way.  
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The Commission also devoted special attention to those agencies with the most intense 
prerogatives: that is to say, those agencies that apply Union standards to specific cases and are 
therefore given the power to adopt individual decisions that are legally binding on third 
parties. This touches the contentious issue of which powers may and, more importantly, may 
not be conferred to agencies. The Commission, referring to the Meroni ruling, therefore 
clarified that the following powers could not be entrusted to agencies: the power to adopt 
general regulatory measures, the power to arbitrate in conflicts between public interests or 
exercise political discretion and those powers conferred on the Commission by the Treaty. As 
was explained before concerning the quasi-regulatory powers entrusted to the EASA, the 
limits which the Commission seeks to impose, referring to Meroni, have already been 
exceeded. Thus the Commission’s proposal concerning a framework for future agencies was 
already outdated in terms of current practice on this matter.  What is more, by withholding the 
exercise of political discretion from agencies, the Commission assumes a clear distinction 
between technical and political issues. In reality this distinction is not clear at all, as Griller 
and Orator also point out.70 The criterion applied by the Commission is not just outdated, as it 
is doubtful whether there ever was a clear distinction between political and technical issues, 
but is probably also oversimplified. This is a serious shortcoming since the way this criterion 
is defined would determine which powers may or may not be entrusted to agencies.  
 
The literal reading of Meroni applied by the Commission to future agencies is therefore not 
workable since the Commission does not elaborate the general concepts it uses to delimitate 
agency powers. It does not lead to the legal certainty the Commission sought with its proposal 
because it does not sufficiently clarify the limits that apply to conferral of powers to agencies, 
as current agency practice also shows. The Commission’s reliance on Meroni seems therefore 
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foremost inspired by its aspiration to defend its powers against possible encroachment by the 
agencies. Instead of using the Meroni judgment to curtail the powers of agencies, a re-read 
Meroni judgment would have the Commission focus on the (judicial) control mechanisms 
applicable to agencies in their functioning and with this the necessary transparency for a 
meaningful accountability. 
 
A real novelty in the draft of the Commission, however, was the proposed composition of the 
Boards of future agencies, which were also to be downsized. The Commission proposed the 
introduction of parity between the Council and the Commission with the possibility to allow 
representatives of interested parties to be members, albeit without voting right. Evidently this 
would be a major change from the current practice and would bring uniformity to the internal 
organization of the agencies. Concerning the appointment of the Director, the Commission 
proposed to consolidate and codify the evolution in practice: the Director would be appointed 
by the Board on the basis of a list of candidates proposed by the Commission. Before the 
official appointment, the candidate might be asked to answer questions and make a 
declaration before the competent committee(s) of the European Parliament. Although the 
procedure proposed by the Commission to appoint the Director was in itself not new, the 
altered composition of the Board would have given the Commission much more leverage in 
the appointment of the Director.  It should be noted that the Commission’s 2005 proposal 
deviates from its 2002 Communication on the operating framework for the European 
Regulatory Agencies.71 In the latter communication, the Commission foresaw that the Director 
would be appointed by the Commission on the basis of a list of candidates from the Board.72 
This was abandoned in 2005, although the Commission did not indicate why. It may be that 
the Commission realized its proposals concerning the Board and the Director combined would 
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have been too ambitious for the Member State as it would have shifted too much power 
towards the Commission, away from the Council and Member States.  
 
B. FOLLOW UP 
 
The Commission’s draft institutional agreement was sent to the other institutions in February 
2005. The Parliament responded positively with a resolution putting forward its position.73 
The Parliament took a co-operative but critical stance. It expressed its concern on the 
continual growth of agencies at the European level and rightly observed that the future 
framework should gradually be applied to existing agencies as well as future agencies. 
However, in its resolution, the Parliament is completely oblivious to the constitutional issues 
concerned in the agencification process and more occupied with the extent of its control over 
the agencies. The Council was not very enthusiastic about the Commission’s draft and, as a 
consequence, this is where the discussions foundered. The legal service of the Council 
doubted whether an interinstitutional agreement was the appropriate instrument for such a 
framework because it felt that the draft submitted by the Commission went beyond the 
establishment of arrangements for co-operation between the institutions. According to the 
Council, the legislature would be bound in the future by a procedure not laid down in the 
Treaties.74 Andoura and Timmerman note that, on a political level, the Council also viewed 
the Commission’s draft as too ambitious and detailed, not leaving enough margin for 
negotiation.75  
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As a result the negotiations came to dead-lock and, in March 2008, the Commission 
announced it would withdraw its proposal for a draft interinstitutional agreement76 (it 
eventually formally did in March 2009).77 Furthermore, the Commission announced it would 
undertake an evaluation of the existing agencies and that it would not propose new agencies 
before this evaluation was concluded.78 The Commission’s pledge to abstain itself from 
proposing new agencies did not, however, survive the financial and economic crisis. As 
Europe and the world were faced with the failures of financial supervision, the Commission 
proposed a European system of supervision, inter alia through the establishment of a number 
of agencies.79 In its 2008 communication, the Commission also invited the Council and 
Parliament to join it in a dialogue, organized in an inter-institutional working group, on the 
place of agencies in European governance. At the same time the Commission also made it 
clear that this would not mean the dialogue should be started from scratch as it would itself 
‘continue to use the philosophy and core principles of the proposed interinstitutional 
agreement as a point of reference for its own approach to agencies.’80 Again the Parliament 
took a constructive stance in voting a resolution reiterating its point of view urging a swift 
commencement of the interinstitutional dialogue.81 Again the Council was more recalcitrant. 
However, unlike the Commission and the Parliament, the Council clearly indicated that the 
interinstitutional working group should also look into the role and position of the agencies in 
the EU's institutional landscape.82 Indeed it is only by answering this question that there can 
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be clarity on the powers entrusted to these agencies and only by clarifying the limits that need 
to be respected in entrusting agencies with certain powers can there be a meaningful debate on 
the level of control and the type of control mechanisms that are necessary and appropriate.  
 
Looking at the proposal and the preceding communications from the Commission, it is clear 
that the principles of good governance have influenced the philosophy of the Commission. 
However, it is equally clear that this philosophy and the endeavours to apply it to the (future) 
agencies is not a simple deduction from these principles. The Commission is not only trying 
to gain more control over the agencies but also tries to codify certain, albeit vague, limits to 
the powers that may be entrusted to them so as to keep agencies in check. In reality, the 
Commission’s proposal consists for a large part in codifying existing agency practice but fails 
to address certain fundamental issues concerning the agencies. The Parliament for its part 
seems primarily concerned with its own powers over the functioning of the agencies, whereas 
only the Council has pointed to the need to include the primordial question on the position of 
the agencies in the institutional architecture of the Union in the debate. Likewise it is the 
institutional balance that seems to be a major concern for the Treaty institutions, their 
contributions to the debate being inspired by institutional self-interest as each of them seeks to 
extend (or maintain) its influence over the agencies and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the 
other Treaty institutions. However, as was noted, the balance of powers in Meroni, which 
touches upon the general interest, is different from the institutional balance, which may be 
seen as a balance between institution-specific interests.  
 
A re-reading of the Meroni judgment would shift the focus away from the uneasy dichotomy 
between executive and discretionary powers and would re-emphasize the balance of powers 
instead of the institutional balance. This would have twofold consequences for the 
Commission’s proposal. For one it would mean the Commission would have to make a bigger 
effort in setting out the limits to the possible conferral of powers to agencies, as it would no 
longer be able to hide behind the too simplistic distinction between executive and 
discretionary powers. More thorough thought by the Commission would ultimately touch 
upon the question of the nature of agencies and their place in the institutional architecture of 
the Union, a question that was left untouched by the Commission in its proposal. Secondly it 
would emphasize, even more than is now the case, the need for transparency in the 
functioning of agencies and, because of a clarified delimitation of powers, the question of 
accountability of both Commission and agencies would be addressed in a more satisfactory 
way, contributing to the realization of the principles of good governance.  
 
§6. CONCLUSION 
 
Although the Meroni ruling is often referred to in the debate on EU agencies, the relevance of 
Meroni for EU agencies should be researched more thoroughly. The question is not so much 
whether Meroni itself is good law but whether the many differences between the facts of the 
case and the context of Meroni and that of the current day EU agencies, can be so easily 
dismissed as is now being done. Additionally, whether it makes sense to apply what was 
originally the balance of powers of Meroni as the institutional balance of Chernobyl to the 
functioning of agencies is an important consideration.  
 
It has been argued that the true relevance of the Meroni ruling for the current process of 
agencification is the concern of the Court to refer to the balance of powers: that the system of 
judicial protection offered by the Treaty should be upheld at all times. This is because the pre-
requisites of accountability in general should be upheld at all times, regardless of the 
delegator, delegatee or the form, content and scope of the delegation. The pre-requisite of 
accountability therefore supersedes the factual and contextual differences between Meroni 
and the current day agencies. However, this general accountability cannot be reduced to a 
purely judicial accountability, as expressed in Meroni, but also involves political 
accountability.  
 
It is political accountability, more precisely political control, which so far has been central to 
the discussions at political level between Commission, Parliament and Council. Of those 
three, the Commission and the Parliament especially seem more concerned with their control 
over the agencies than with the constitutional positioning of the agencies while the former 
actually depends on latter. When the Commission refers to the Meroni ruling to interpret the 
position of the agencies, this seems foremost inspired by the desire of the Commission to stay 
‘on top’ of the agencies. This is all the more apparent when the Commission tries to apply a 
strict reading of the Meroni doctrine on the future agencies, even though the functioning of 
the current agencies already is in contravention to such a strict reading. A re-reading of the 
Meroni judgment would help the Commission (re)focus the debate on those fundamental 
issues concerning agencification, that so far are too much neglected. 
